Policy biases when the monetary and fiscal authorities have different objectives

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dc.contributor.authorBennett C., Herman
dc.contributor.authorLoayza O., Norman
dc.date.accessioned2019-11-01T00:01:36Z
dc.date.available2019-11-01T00:01:36Z
dc.date.issued2002
dc.descriptionUntil recently, the debate on the relationship between monetary and fiscal authorities centered on the inflationary consequences of mentary financing of the fiscal deficit. The moderately high inflation of the 1970s in some industrialized countries and, particularly, the recurring episodes of very high inflation in several developing countries seeking to avoid high and variable inflation has been to institute an independent monetary authority whose main mandate is the control of inflation.
dc.file.nameBCCh-sbc-v04-p299_330
dc.format.pdf
dc.format.extentSección o Parte de un Documento
dc.format.mediump. 299-330
dc.identifier.isbn956-7421-099
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12580/3659
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherBanco Central de Chile
dc.relation.ispartofSerieson Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies, no. 4
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/*
dc.subjectPOLÍTICA MONETARIAes_ES
dc.subjectPOLÍTICA FISCALes_ES
dc.subjectINFLACIÓNes_ES
dc.titlePolicy biases when the monetary and fiscal authorities have different objectives
dc.type.docArtículo

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